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John Doris and Friedrich Nietzsche have a lot in common. In addition to being 
provocative and humorous writers in their native idioms, they share a conception of human 
agency. It can be tiresome to point out the priority claims of an earlier philosopher, so I should 
say at the outset that I do so not to smugly insist that my guy got there first but to showcase a 
closely-allied perspective that may shed additional light and offer glimpses around blind corners. 
In particular, I argue that Nietzsche anticipates both the anti-reflective and the dialogical aspects 
of Doris’s theory of agency. 
Doris’s primary target is reflectivism, according to which the exercise of human agency 
consists in judgment and behavior ordered by (accurate enough) reflection about what to think 
and do. As Paul Katsafanas (2013, 2016) and I (Alfano 2010, 2013b, 2016c) have argued, 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of will to power presupposes that human agency does not require reflection. 
Instead, agency emerges from the interaction of drives, affects, and emotions that are sometimes 
in harmony and sometimes in conflict (Daybreak 119; Gay Science 333, 354, 357; Beyond Good 
and Evil 6, 12, 200, 224; Genealogy of Morals I:13, II:16).1 While affects and emotions receive 
much attention in contemporary dual-process psychology, drives – which Nietzsche construes as 
standing motivational dispositions to engage in particular action-types – have largely been 
ignored. The Nietzschean perspective thus expands the class of mental processes that can lead to 
incongruent parallel processing, though empirical research is of course needed to determine the 
role played by drives in our mental economies. 
Like Doris, Nietzsche is concerned that incongruent parallel processing may undermine 
agency. Doris focuses on cases in which someone would not endorse the causes of her own 
behavior because those causes are what I have dubbed “non-reasons” (Alfano 2013a, pp. 43-45). 
While Nietzsche does not rule out such arational influences on behavior, his concern is directed 
to cases in which someone would outright reject an accurate description of the causes of her 
behavior (Genealogy of Morals I:10-11, II:11, III:15). Nietzsche’s solution to the problem of 
incongruent parallel processing also resembles Doris’s. According to Doris, someone’s behavior 
constitutes an exercise of agency just in case it expresses a subset of the agent’s values: namely, 
those values that are sufficiently longstanding, strong, and accepted by the agent as justificatory. 
The key move in this account is to allow for agency despite self-ignorance. The agent needn’t 
know that she is willing to assign a justificatory role to the values she expresses in action, nor 
need she realize that her exercise of agency expresses one or more of her values. Similarly, for 
Nietzsche (Daybreak 109; Beyond Good and Evil 3), someone’s behavior constitutes an exercise 
of agency just in case it expresses a subset of the agent’s drives, affects, and emotions: namely, 
those that, were the agent to learn about them, would not lead her to disapprove of her own 
action (Katsafanas 2013, p. 138; 2016, ch. 7). Like Doris, then, Nietzsche allows for agency 
despite substantial self-ignorance. The agent needn’t know that she would endorse her own 
action after learning more about its etiology, nor need she know which drives, affects, and 
emotions led to her action in the first place. 
                                               
1 I refer to Nietzsche’s texts using the canonical section numbering rather than page numbers. 
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Lowering the bar of accurate reflection in this way enables Doris and Nietzsche to 
countenance and even make use of a common human foible: the tendency to post hoc 
confabulation. When we reflect on why we did what we did or what sorts of people we are, we 
often enough tell ourselves flattering stories that enhance our own rationality, moral rectitude, or 
agency – turning every “it was” into a “thus I willed it” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra II.Redemption; 
see also Gay Science 277). Without disputing the inaccuracy of such confabulation, Doris argues 
that it can lend someone the courage to move confidently into the future, to undertake ambitious 
projects, and to make demanding commitments. Tactically deployed fictions about ourselves can 
become facts. Indeed, in Alfano (2013a ch. 4; see also Alfano 2016a, ch. 4 and 2016b) I argue 
that they can lead to factitious traits of character, where someone becomes, for example, honest 
because she first falsely attributes honesty to herself. 
To understand how people manage this trick, we must turn to the dialogical aspect of 
Doris’s and Nietzsche’s conception of agency. Doris’s secondary target is individualism, 
according to which optimal human decision-making is exemplified by individual thinkers. He 
argues instead for collaborativism, according to which human decision-making and agency are 
socially embedded and perhaps even extended through dialogical processes. The factitiously 
honest person is (typically) not honest in splendid isolation. Instead, she engages in social 
interactions that “hold” her in a network of narratives that represent what she and those close to 
her consider her most important actions, passions, traits, roles, relationships, and values (cf. 
Lindemann 2014). 
There are several ways in which such narratives help to build and stabilize human 
persons. They can change someone’s self-concept by representing them as embodying values or 
drives that they previously did not self-attribute. They can reassure someone of the accuracy of 
their self-concept by providing social proof. They can lend someone a communal identity by 
representing them as one of “us.” And they can help to “shape and crystallize” someone’s traits 
and values by “making more determinate tendencies and impulses […] that are in some degree 
inchoate” (Wong 2006, p. 136). If this is right, then talking about our mental lives resembles not 
so much describing the weather as negotiating a cooperative agreement.  
As I argue in Alfano (2015, 2016c), Nietzsche identifies two main channels through 
which such dialogical processes flow (Human, All-Too-Human 51; Daybreak 105, 201, 248; Gay 
Science 21, 40, 58; Beyond Good and Evil 42, 44, 261; Genealogy of Morals I:2, I:6). On the one 
hand, sometimes a person announces what she is (i.e., what her values, motives, concerns, or 
drives are), and that announcement meets with social acceptance; on the other hand, sometimes 
someone else announces what the person is, and she accepts the attribution. Such bid-and-accept 
patterns can be iterated. X could describe herself has embodying value V, to which Y responds 
by pointing to evidence (e.g., in her past behavior) that she actually embodies value V*, to which 
X responds by pointing to evidence that she actually embodies V†, and so on. Moreover, the 
negotiation needn’t be so explicit. X could instead tell a story that represents herself as 
embodying V, to which Y responds by asking a question that presupposes that she embodies V*, 
to which X responds by telling another story that represents herself as embodying V†. The kind 
of person or self that emerges from such feedback loops is reflected or echoed rather than 
reflective and transparent. 
If this is right, then much of human agency is constitutively social. Moreover, it suggests 
that a novel class of dispositions – namely, the dispositions associated with being a good echo – 
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must be recognized and theorized by philosophers and social scientists.2 A virtuous echoer may 
not be entirely accurate and comprehensive. Instead, I contend, a virtuous echoer filters and 
perhaps even distorts to some extent; in this way, the echoer modulates existing dispositions 
without inventing them whole cloth. By contrast, a vicious echo may negotiate their partner into 
accepting an unflattering self-description or even an incoherent self-description, undermining 
their agency. 
I conclude with a speculation about the future of dialogical agency in the wake of self-
tracking technologies and predictive analytics (cf. Selke 2016). If it’s true that someone’s agency 
and self are constructed by the stories she tells and is told about herself, and that these stories 
need be neither wholly accurate nor unfiltered, then such technologies and analytics may curtail 
one’s capacity to – in Nietzsche’s phrase – become what one is. Self-tracking is liable to make it 
more difficult to enjoy self-enhancing illusions. If I tell a story about how I once did this or saw 
that, it may become possible for me or someone else to verify or falsify my narrative. In addition, 
predictive analytics is liable to make it more difficult to have inflated confidence in one’s 
capabilities. If positive illusions about my own potential enable me to undertake ambitious plans 
and commitments, then well-evidenced predictions that I am likely to fail may keep from trying 
in the first place. There may be a steep prudential price to be paid for the epistemic benefits of 
these innovations. 
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